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This paper examines why credit constraints for domestic and exporting firms arise in a setting where
banks do not observe firms' productivities. To maintain incentive-compatibility, banks lend below
the amount needed for first-best production. The longer time needed for export shipments induces
a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters' home
market. Greater risk faced by exporters also affects the credit extended by banks. Extra fixed costs
reduce exports on the extensive margin, but can be offset by collateral held by exporting firms. The
empirical application to Chinese firms strongly supports these theoretical results, and we find a sizable
impact of the financial crisis in reducing exports.
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The ￿nancial crisis of 2008 has led researchers to ask whether credit constraints faced by exporters
played a signi￿cant role in the fall in world trade. There are a wide range of answers: Amiti and
Weinstein (2009) argue that trade ￿nance was important in the earlier Japanese ￿nancial crisis of the
1990s, and Chor and Manova (2010) ￿nd that ￿nancially vulnerable sectors in source countries did
indeed experience a sharper drop in monthly export to the United States. In contrast, Levchenko,
Lewis and Tesar (2010) ￿nd no evidence that trade credit played a role in restricting imports or
exports for the recent episode in the U.S., while for Belgium, Behrens, Corcos and Mion (2010) argue
that to the extent that ￿nancial variables impacted exports, they also impacted domestic sales to the
same extent. Of course, the potential causal link between ￿nancial development and international
trade at country level was recognized long before the recent crisis. For example, Kletzer and
Bardhan (1987; see also Qiu, 1999, Beck, 2002, and Matsuyama, 2005) argued that credit-market
imperfections would adversely a⁄ect exporters needing more ￿nance and hence in￿ uence trade
patterns. That theme was picked up in a Melitz (2003) model by Chaney (2005), and implemented
by Manova (2008), who argue that credit constraints a⁄ect exporting ￿rms in di⁄erent countries
and industries di⁄erently due to ￿xed costs.1
In view of these divergent empirical ￿ndings, we believe that it is useful to go back to the theory
and ask why credit for exports should be allocated any di⁄erently than credit for domestic sales.
Amiti and Weinstein (2009) argue forcefully for two reasons: there is a longer time-lag between
production and the receipt of sales revenue; and exporters also face inherently more risk, since
it is more di¢ cult to enforce payment across country boundaries. They de￿ne "trade ￿nance"
(as distinct from "trade credit") to be the ￿nancial contracts that arise to o⁄set these risks for
exporters.2 To these reasons we add the extra ￿xed costs faced by exporters, in a Melitz-style
model, as a third reason why exporters might need more credit. The goal of this paper is to build
these three reasons into a model of heterogeneous ￿rms obtaining working-capital loans from a
bank, to see whether exports are indeed treated di⁄erently from domestic sales in theory. We test
the predictions of the model using ￿rm-level data for China.
The key feature of our model is that the bank has incomplete knowledge of ￿rms, in two respects.
1Other papers dealing with trade and ￿nance include Qiu (1999), Greenaway, et al (2007), Mußls (2008), Buch,
et al (2008), HØricourt and Poncet (2009), Poncet et al (2009), and Egger and Keuschnigg (2011).
2Trade credit refers to an accounting convention whereby accounts receivable for either domestic or foreign sales
are credited when a shipment takes place and before payment is received.
1First, the bank cannot observe the productivity of ￿rms. We believe this assumption is realistic in
rapidly growing economies such as China with rapid entry, and perhaps more generally. The bank
will confront ￿rms with a schedule specifying the amount of the loan and the interest payments to
maximize its own pro￿ts. From the revelation principle, without loss of generality we can restrict
attention to schedules that induce ￿rms to truthfully reveal their productivity. Second, the bank
cannot verify whether the loan is used to cover the costs of production for domestic sales or for
exports. This second assumption means that we are not really modeling the loans from the bank
as "trade ￿nance": such loans would typically specify the names of the buying and selling party,
at least, so the bank could presumably verify whether the loan was for exports or not. Rather, the
loans being made by the bank are for "working capital," to cover the costs of current production,
regardless of where the output is sold. The assumption that banks cannot follow a loan once the
money enters the ￿rm is made in a di⁄erent context by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), for example.
With these assumptions, in section 2 we derive the incentive-compatible loan schedule by the
bank that maximizes its own pro￿ts. Sales revenue of ￿rms is less than would occur in the absence of
any working-capital needs, i.e. the incentive-compatible loans impose credit constraints on ￿rms.
The reason for these credit constraints is that a ￿rm su⁄ers only a second-order loss in pro￿ts
from producing slightly less than the ￿rst-best and borrowing less from the bank, but obtains
a ￿rst-order gain from reducing its interest payments in this way. So a ￿rm that is not credit
constrained will never reveal its true productivity and borrow enough to produce at the ￿rst-best;
hence, incentive-compatibility requires that the ￿rm is credit constrained. Furthermore, because
banks cannot follow a loan once it enters the ￿rm, the credit constraint applies to the exports and
domestic sales of a ￿rm engaged in both these activities ￿which we refer to as an exporting ￿rm.
Because exports take longer in shipment, such exporting ￿rms face a tighter credit constraint on
both markets than purely domestic ￿rms
So our answer to the question "is credit for exports and domestic sales treated di⁄erently?" is
nuanced: when these activities occur in the same ￿rm, the bank treats them equally; but when
these activities occur in an exporting ￿rm and a purely domestic ￿rm respectively, they are indeed
treated di⁄erently. The tighter credit constraint on exporting ￿rms comes from the ￿rst reason for
exports to be treated di⁄erently than domestic sales ￿the longer time-lag between production and
receipt of sales revenue ￿and reduces exports on the intensive and extensive margins. The second
reason, greater risk, arises due to the risk of a ￿rm not being paid ￿what we call "project risk" ￿
2or the default risk of the ￿rm not repaying the bank. We ￿nd that higher default risk for exporters
raises their interest payments for any given loan, acting in a similar manner to credit constraints.
The third reason, which is the extra ￿xed costs faced by exporters, reduces the extensive margin of
exports. As in Manova (2008), we ￿nd that higher expected collateral held by exporters can o⁄set
this e⁄ect and expand the extensive margin.
These theoretical results are tested using a rich panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing ￿rms
over the period of 2000-2008, in sections 3 and 4. This application is of special interest because
China￿ s exports experienced unprecedented growth over the past decades, while it is believed that
Chinese ￿rms faced severe credit constraints: according to the Investment Climate Assessment
surveys in 2002, China was among the group of countries that had the worst ￿nancing obstacles
(Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006). Using China￿ s ￿rm-level data to test our model, we estimate a
structural equation under which sales revenue is a linear function of interest payments and other
variables. The coe¢ cients in this regression can di⁄er across ￿rms, which we control for using the
￿xed e⁄ects-instrumental variable technique of Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2008). We obtain
robust empirical evidence that exporting ￿rms face more severe credit constraints than purely
domestic ￿rms, and ￿nd that the ￿nancial crisis further tightened this credit constraint. We also
con￿rm the empirical ￿nding of Manova, Wei and Zhang (2009) that the credit constraint is much
weaker for multinational ￿rms in China.3 Conclusions and directions for further research are
discussed in section 5.
2 Incentive-Compatible Loans
2.1 The Model
We suppose there are two countries, home and foreign (henceforth foreign counterparts of the
variables are denoted with an asterisk ￿). Labor is the only factor for production and the population
is of size L at home. There are two sectors, where the ￿rst produces a single homogeneous good that
is freely traded and chosen as numeraire. Each unit of labor in this sector produces a given number
of units of the homogeneous good. We assume that both countries produce in this sector and it
follows that wages are thus ￿xed by the productivity in this sector. The second sector produces a
continuum of di⁄erentiated goods under monopolistic competition, as in Melitz (2003).
3That result is found for other developing countries by Harrison and McMillan (2003) and Antr￿s, Desai and Foley
(2009).
32.1.1 Consumers
Consumers are endowed with one unit of labor and the preference over the di⁄erentiated good
















where ! denotes each variety, ￿ is the set of varieties available to the consumer, ￿ > 1 is the
constant elasticity of substitution between each variety, and ￿ is the share of expenditure on the





















where Y ￿ ￿wL is the total expenditure on the di⁄erentiated good at home.
2.1.2 Firms and the Bank
Firms in the di⁄erentiated sector need to borrow working capital to ￿nance a fraction ￿ of their
￿xed and variable costs. The parameter ￿ could re￿ ect the capital-intensity of production, for
example. We treat ￿ as equal across all domestic and exporting ￿rms in the model, but in our
empirical application will allow it to di⁄er across ￿rms and sectors in an idiosyncratic manner.
Firms borrow from a single, monopolistic bank, and the bank will charge interest payments to
maximize its pro￿ts. The bank faces an opportunity cost of i ￿the interest rate ￿on its loans. We
will assume that the loans for domestic (export) projects are paid back after ￿d (￿e) periods, and
further assume that ￿e > ￿d, re￿ ecting the longer time-lags involving in the shipping of exports. So
the opportunity cost to the bank for a loan extended for domestic or exports sales is i￿d and i￿e,
respectively.
We introduce project risk by supposing that there is some probability that any project (domestic
or export) receives its sales revenue. Domestic sales are successful with probability sd ￿ 1, meaning
that ￿rms receive their revenue pdqd with probability sd; and zero otherwise. Likewise, exports are
successful with probability se ￿ sd. The possibly lower probability of collecting on export sales can
4re￿ ect more stringent speci￿cations of quality in foreign countries, which the exporter might not
achieve; the di¢ culty of taking legal action to collect payment across country boundaries; or any
other risks associated with exports.
We also introduce default risk by supposing that the loan and interest payment might not
be paid back by the ￿rm. The probability that the domestic ￿rm pays back the loan and interest
payment is ￿d, and that for the exporter is ￿e. The default risk may due to the the project not being
successful, or some other extra uncertainties that makes the ￿rm to default the payment. Lack of
￿nancial contractibility and contract enforcement discussed by Manova (2008) is one possible source
of these uncertainties. We assume that ￿d ￿ sd and ￿e ￿ se to indicate these extra uncertainties of
repayment, and further assume that ￿e ￿ ￿d.4
2.2 Domestic Firms￿Decision
Under incomplete information, the bank does not observe the productivity level x of a ￿rm coming
to it for a loan. In order to maximize pro￿ts, the bank will design a schedule of loans Md(x0) and
interest payments Id(x0) contingent on the announced productivity level x0. If the ￿rm defaults,
which occurs with probability (1 ￿ ￿d); we follow Manova (2008) in assuming that the bank can
collect the collateral amount, Kd:
By the revelation principle, the bank can do no better than to design a loan-interest payment
schedule that induces ￿rms to reveal their true productivity, x0 = x: Adding this incentive compat-
















￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)Kd (3)











and also subject to the domestic demand function in (2). In this problem, the ￿rm pays the fraction
(1 ￿ ￿) of costs with certainty, while borrowing for the remainder and repaying with probability
￿d: The ￿rst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint, the second ensures that expected
pro￿ts are non-negative, and the third speci￿es that the amount of the loan must cover the fraction
￿ of ￿xed and variable costs at the chosen production level qd. Manova (2008) includes another
4Note that Manova (2008) assumes sd = se = 1 and focuses on ￿e < 1. In contrast, Amiti and Weinstein (2009)
discuss the reasons to have sd < se, which they refer to as default risk but we call project risk.
5constraint, stating that when the ￿rm pays back the loan and interest to the bank, the sum of those
amounts cannot exceed the total revenue of the ￿rm. This condition, which we call a "cash ￿ ow
constraint," might or might not be binding at the optimal solution we derive in its absence. For
convenience we ignore this constraint for now and introduce it in section 2.5.










Provided that the loan and interest payment schedules are di⁄erentiable in x0; then the incentive-







By substituting the quantity equation (4) into the demand function (2) we solve for the price. Using
that we derive the ￿rms￿pro￿ts E (￿d(x;x0)); and take the derivative as in (5) to obtain:



































The value of ￿d on the ￿rst line of (7) is recognized as the ratio of expected marginal revenue
to marginal costs. A ￿rm facing the project risk of sd but without any need to borrow will produce
where ￿d = 1; while a ￿rm that produces less due to insu¢ cient loans will have ￿d > 1. This
means that ￿d is a measure of ￿rm￿ s credit constraint, and the larger is ￿d then the lower is the
quantity produced due to this constraint. The second line of (7) is obtained by using the quantity
in (4) and solving for the corresponding price from demand (2). It is apparent that having lower
loans Md(x) will raise ￿d; indicating that the credit constraint is tightened.
We can now develop some intuition as to why the bank might need to impose credit constraints.
Let us suppose that the bank lends more to higher productivity ￿rms, and also collects more in
interest payments: we will con￿rm that these monotonicity conditions hold in the optimal schedules
for the bank. Then in (6), both M0
d(x) and I0
d(x) are positive. It follows that the expression in
5Note that q and p both depend on x, but for simplicity we omit this from the notation.
6brackets on the left must be positive, so in the no-default case where ￿d = 1 it follows that the
￿rm must be credit constrained, i.e. ￿d > 1: The reason this condition is needed is that a ￿rm
that is producing at the ￿rst-best with marginal revenue equal to marginal cost would have only
a second-order loss in pro￿ts from announcing a slightly smaller productivity x0, and producing
slightly less. But the ￿rm would have a ￿rst-order gain from the reduction in interest payments
I0
d(x) > 0. So a ￿rm at the ￿rst-best would always understate its productivity, and it follows that a
credit constraint is needed to ensure incentive compatibility. We will formalize this intuition below,
and show that ￿d > 1 even in the presence of default.
2.3 Exporters￿Decision
We assume that the monopolistic bank cannot enforce di⁄erent contracts to separate loans for
domestic market and export market. Rather, exporters are free to determine how to allocate the
loan to both markets. In comparison with purely domestic ￿rms, exporters have three di⁄erences:
(i) longer time needed to pay back their export loans ￿e > ￿d (which enters the bank￿ s problem
analyzed in the next section); (ii) potentially greater project risk , se ￿ sd; and default risk, ￿e ￿ ￿d,
where we assume that the default risk for the exporter applies to the total loan from the bank; (iii)
additional ￿xed costs of exporting, which are denoted by Ce.
An exporter chooses quantities to produce at domestic market and export market and claims a
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where Y ￿ is the foreign total expenditure on the di⁄erentiated good.6 The total loan received by
6We do not make explicit the transportation costs to the export market for expositional convenience, but that
iceberg cost can readily be incorporated into the de￿nition of the "e⁄ective" foreign expenditure on the di⁄erentiated
good Y





equals that shown in (9) by de￿ning Y
￿ = ~ Y
￿￿
￿￿:
7the exporter is denoted by Me and total interest payments are Ie, while Ke is the exporter￿ s total
collateral.
The ￿rst two constraints above are analogous to those for the domestic ￿rm, but the third
constraint is di⁄erent and important. It states that the total amount of the loan given to the
exporter must cover the working-capital needs of both domestic and export production costs. From
the exporting ￿rm￿ s perspective, these funds are fully fungible so the bank is making a single loan.
Likewise, the bank will receive a single interest payment, which is ￿eIe(x0) in expected value. In
addition, a "cash ￿ ow constraint" stating that the loan amount plus interest cannot exceed the
available revenue from the ￿rm, also applies for exporters. It might or might not be binding and
we ignore this constraint for now.
Setting up a Lagrangian with the objective function and the third constraint, and solving this
problem for the choice of qd and qe, it is readily shown that the ￿rm will maximize its pro￿t by












This condition states that the loan will be allocated within the ￿rm so that expected marginal
revenue in the domestic and export markets are equalized. It means that for any given loan, the
bank will know exactly how production is allocated between the two markets. Thus for notational
convenience, we break up the total loan Me(x0) into the component intended to cover domestic costs
Md
e(x0), and the component intended to cover export costs Me
e(x0). That is, for any announcement
of productivity x0, and subsequent choice of quantities satisfying (10), we will de￿ne the loans















We can readily solve for this allocation of loans by subtracting ￿xed costs from both sides of
(11) and taking the ratio. Then using demand in (2) and (9), combined with the requirement
from (10) that the expected prices sdpd and sepe are equalized, it follows that the loans to the two














dY P￿￿1 + s￿




dY P￿￿1 + s￿
eY ￿P￿￿￿1: (13)
We see from (12) that there is a simple, linear relationship between the loans allocated to the
two markets. We can now proceed analogously to the domestic ￿rms￿problem. We use (11) to
determine the quantity sold in each market analogous to (4), depending on the loans Md
e(x0) and
Me
e(x0), and substitute into demand (2) and (9) for each market to determine prices. With these
we obtain the ￿rms￿pro￿ts E (￿e(x;x0)): Taking the derivative of expected pro￿ts with respect to































































































The interpretation of these conditions is analogous to what we obtained for domestic ￿rms. The
values ￿d
e and ￿e
e are the ratio of expected marginal revenue to marginal costs in the two markets
served by the exporter. Credit constraints would mean that ￿e
e > 1 and ￿d
e > 1, so the ￿rm would
be selling less in both markets than would be optimal in the absence of any risk or constraints. We
now determine the magnitude of credit constraints that are optimal for the bank.
2.4 Bank￿ s Decision
We do not assume that the bank can identify domestic ￿rms and exporters, but only observes the
announced productivities of ￿rms. As in the Melitz (2003) model, ￿rms will enter into domestic
production and export based on the pro￿tability of these activities. This means that the cuto⁄
9domestic ￿rm with productivity x
ﬂ





and the cuto⁄exporter with productivity x
ﬂ









cuto⁄ productivities can di⁄er from in the Melitz (2003) model, of course, because here they are
in￿ uenced by the credit conditions o⁄ered by banks. A standard property of ￿rm pro￿ts under
any incentive-compatible policy is that they must be non-deceasing in the true productivity, i.e.
E (￿d(x;x)) and E (￿e(x;x)) are non-decreasing in x:7 We will identify additional conditions below
needed to ensure that the cuto⁄ exporter, in particular, is well de￿ned.8
The monopolistic bank chooses the loans given to domestic ￿rms subject to the incentive-
compatibility condition (6), and chooses the loans given to exporters for the domestic market
(Md
e(x)) and for export market (Me
e(x)), subject to the incentive-compatibility conditions (14) and
the equality of marginal revenue (16). The bank￿ s problem is then to choose Md (x);Md
e (x);Me
e (x);Id (x)













￿eIe(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e)(Me (x) ￿ Ke) ￿ i￿dMd








e); and (14) and (16) if x 2 [x
ﬂ
e;1);
where i is the opportunity cost of lending the loan for one unit of period and ￿d and ￿e are the length
of the periods that the ￿rm has to hold the loans in the domestic and export market respectively,
as de￿ned earlier. The probability density function of ￿rms￿productivity distribution is f (x).
The maximization problem (17) is solved in two steps. First, we determine the loan schedule
that maximizes bank￿ s pro￿t, which is an optimal control problem analyzed in Appendix A. The
derivative of the optimal loan schedules will be related to the derivative of the interest payments
through the incentive-compatibility conditions (6) and (14). But that still leaves open the initial
level of interest payments for the cuto⁄domestic and exporting ￿rms: these initial interest payments




e for these ￿rms. So the second step in the
optimization problem for the bank is to determine the optimal initial interest payments for these
cuto⁄￿rms, or equivalently, solving for the optimal cuto⁄productivities and consequently obtaining
the implied initial interest payments.
7This is established in Baron and Myerson (1982), and subsequent literature.
8See note 9 and Appendix A.3.
102.4.1 The Loan Schedules
The solution for the optimal loan schedules for the bank is simpli￿ed using the fact that the credit
constraints in the domestic and export market must satisfy (16). In addition the loans to domestic
and export production of the exporter are linearly related by (12), so we only need to analyze one
of these, say Md
e, in addition to the loans Md provided to domestic ￿rms. It is shown in Appendix
A that the optimal loan schedules for the bank satis￿es the following conditions:






























where ￿d and ￿e denotes the relative size of the domestic market and the export market respectively,
as in (13), and F (x) is the cumulative density function of x. Substituting the full expressions for








e(x)) from (15) into the above conditions, we
obtain nonlinear equations de￿ning the loan schedules for domestic ￿rms and exporters.
To simplify this solution, we consider a Pareto distribution for ￿rms productivity, F (x) =
1 ￿ (1=x)
￿ ;x ￿ 1; where ￿ is the shape parameter. Then the credit constraints above become
constant values:





















The weak condition ￿ > (￿ ￿ 1)=￿; as we assume holds, is su¢ cient for ￿d and ￿e to be greater
























































With these loan schedules, ￿rms will produce a constant fraction of their credit-free quantity in
11each market,







































P￿1￿￿ are the chosen level of production
in the domestic market and export market, respectively, in the presence of project risk but without
any need for credit.
Examining the features of these solutions (19), we see that credit constraints for domestic ￿rms
and exporters apply, meaning that ￿d > 1 and ￿e > 1; even if i = 0 in (19). Thus, even when
the banks has no opportunity cost of making loans, a credit constraint is still needed to ensure
incentive compatibility. When i > 0 then the credit constraint is further increased and we see from
(20) that loans are reduced. It is intuitive that the bank will restrict loans as its opportunity cost
rises. Furthermore the opportunity cost is measured relative to the time required for the domestic
and foreign loans, or ￿d and ￿e, respectively. We have assumed that ￿e > ￿d, from which it follows
that the credit constraint ￿e for exporters in either their domestic or export markets exceeds ￿d for
domestic ￿rms in (19), when i > 0. This result will be the key testable implication in our empirical
application.
2.4.2 The Cuto⁄ Productivity Levels
The solutions for the loan schedules and credit constraints, combined with the incentive-compatibility
constraints, immediately imply the slope for the interest payment schedules. But the entire sched-
ules are not pinned down until we also determine their initial values. As discussed above, the
initial interest payment for a domestic ￿rm will determine x
ﬂ





d)) = 0; and likewise the initial interest payment for the marginal exporter will deter-
mine x
ﬂ








e)): So we can solve for the initial interest




e, and using these ￿rst-order conditions
to determine the initial interest payments, as discussed in Appendix A.
By taking the ￿rst derivative of (17) with respect to x
ﬂ
d, we can get the loan and the interest















￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)Kd: (23)
Consequently, the interest payment for the domestic ￿rms is:
￿dId(x) =
￿
￿d + ￿(1 ￿ ￿d) ￿ 1
￿ Md(x)
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)Kd: (24)
The amount ￿Cd appearing in (22) is identical to the total costs of the ￿rst-best production for
the cuto⁄ producer in Melitz (2003). Despite this, the cuto⁄ productivity x
ﬂ
d di⁄ers from that in
Melitz (2003), because the domestic ￿rm faces a credit constraint and therefore produces less than
the ￿rst-best. It follows that ￿Cd ￿nances the costs of a ￿rm with productivity above the ￿rst-best
cuto⁄ productivity in Melitz (2003). That productivity is obtained by combining (22) with the

















Our ￿nding that ￿d > 1 means that this cuto⁄productivity exceeds that in Melitz (2003), which is
obtained when ￿d = 1. Therefore, the credit constaint ￿d > 1 not only reduces the intensive margin
of production for domestic ￿rms, it also reduces their extensive margin. This cuto⁄ productivity
is implemented by the bank charging the interest shown in (23). Notice that the bank only cares
about the total expected payments ￿dId(x
ﬂ
d) + (1 ￿ ￿d)Kd; including collateral.
Taking the ￿rst derivative of (17) with respect to x
ﬂ
e, we obtain the solution for the initial loan



































￿ (￿dCe ￿ ￿eCd) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e)Ke:
13Consequently, the interest payment schedule for exporters is then:
￿eIe(x) =
￿




To interpret these parameters, consider ￿rst the case where i = 0: Then we see that ￿ =
1=(1 ￿ ￿d) = 1=￿e; or the inverse of the relative size of the export market. It can be con￿rmed
that the amount Me
e(x
ﬂ
e)=￿ given by (26) is then precisely equal to the export costs of ￿rst-best
production for the cuto⁄ exporter in the Melitz (2003) model. But for the same reason as above,
the cuto⁄ productivity is higher in our setting where ￿rms are credit constrained. Speci￿cally,



















It is readily con￿rmed that ￿ is increasing in i under our maintained assumption that ￿e > ￿d:9
Combined with the fact that ￿e > 1; this means that the cuto⁄ productivity obtained from (29)
exceeds that in Melitz (2003), which is obtained when ￿ = 1=￿e and ￿e = 1. Thus, the credit
constraint implies a reduction in exports on both the intensive and extensive margins, and this
reduction exceeds what we found for the domestic market, since ￿e > ￿d when i > 0: This cuto⁄
productivity for the exporter is implemented by the bank charging the interest shown in (27), which
depends on the term ￿: Under our assumption that ￿e > ￿d; the ￿rst term in ￿ is greater than
zero if and only if ￿d=Cd > ￿e=Ce; i.e. the domestic market size relative to ￿xed costs exceeds that
for the export market. This assumption is commonly made in the Melitz (2003) model and we also
use it here.
In our solutions so far, neither the default risk nor the level of collateral enter the credit
constraints nor a⁄ect the extensive margin of producing ￿rms. The reason for this result is that
the bank only cares about the total expected payments it receives, which includes interest and
collateral, as seen by moving the collateral term to the left in (23) and (27). As collateral rises,
interest payments correspondingly fall, but no other variables or margins in the model are a⁄ected.
This special feature of the solution will not occur, however, when we introduce the "cash ￿ ow





￿d < 1 is needed to ensure that E (￿e(x;x)) has a larger
slope than E (￿d(x;x)): This slope condition holds automatically in the Melitz model, but here we need to add it an
extra assumption in order to get a well-de￿ned solution for the marginal exporter.
14constraint" next, which states that a ￿rm needs enough revenue on hand to pay back the loan and
interest to the bank.
2.5 Cash Flow Constraint
Manova (2008) uses a cash ￿ ow constraint (but referring to it as a credit constraint) to explain why
exporters might be limited in their loans: they need enough cash from sales revenue to repay the
loan plus interest. We now explore whether such constraints will operate di⁄erently for domestic
and exporting ￿rms. Speci￿cally, provided that the incentive compatibility condition ensures that
￿rms claim their true productivities, the cash ￿ ow constraints for domestic ￿rms and exporters are,
CFd (x) = pdqd ￿ Md(x)=￿ ￿ Id(x) ￿ 0; (30)
CFe (x) = pdqd + peqe ￿ Me(x)=￿ ￿ Ie(x) ￿ 0: (31)
Notice that these constraints ignore the probabilities sd and se that domestic and export revenue
are received, and also the probabilities ￿d and ￿e that domestic ￿rms and exporters repay the
bank. Rather, these are ex post constraints that apply when projects are successful and there
is no default by the ￿rm. Generally, we view the default probabilities of the ￿rms as bounded
above by the project-success probabilities, i.e. ￿d ￿ sd; and ￿e ￿ se: When these inequalities
are strict then we will ￿nd that the cash ￿ ow constraints are tighter than the zero-cuto⁄-pro￿t
constraints, which are stated in terms of expected pro￿ts, and therefore might be violated in the
equilibrium we have already derived. We do not want to consider values of the default probabilities
that are too low, however, since in that case the cash ￿ ow constraints in (30) and (31) might not
be monotonically increasing in x: That monotonicity condition is assumed by Manova (2008), who
argues that small ￿rms are more likely to face a cash ￿ ow constraint than large ￿rms. We can ensure
that CF0
d (x) > 0 and CF0

















, which we assume are satis￿ed.
When the cash ￿ ow constraints are violated in the equilibrium we have already described, then
the marginal ￿rm cannot a⁄ord to repay the bank. We suppose that the bank anticipates this and
raises the cuto⁄ productivity at which it lends to domestic or export ￿rms. Speci￿cally, we solve
for these cuto⁄ productivities by the condition that the cash ￿ ow equals zero. But ￿rst, we need
to check whether the cash ￿ ow constraint is binding or not in our previous solution.
We substitute the cuto⁄ productivities, (25) and (29), into the two cash ￿ ow constraints, (30)
15and (31), and follow Manova (2008) in assuming that the collateral is a fraction, k; of the ￿xed
costs, i.e. Kd = kCd and Ke = k(Cd + Ce). Then we ￿nd that the cash ￿ ow constraint for the
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:
To interpret (32), suppose that the probability of a successful project for a domestic ￿rm, sd;
equals the probability of repaying its loan, ￿d: Then it is immediate that (32) is satis￿ed even if
k = 0; that is, even if the domestic ￿rm has no collateral at all. If it is more likely that the ￿rm
defaults on its bank loan, so that ￿d < sd; and by enough so that the right (32) is strictly positive,
then the ￿rm will need some positive level of collateral to satisfy the cash ￿ ow constraint. The
bene￿t of collateral is that it directly reduces the interest payment to the bank, from (23), and
therefore makes the cash ￿ ow constraint (30) easier to satisfy.
The condition for the cash ￿ ow constraint for the exporter to be satis￿ed is more complex.
Continuing with the assumption ￿d = sd, let us also assume i = 0 and ￿e = se but that the
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The ￿rst term on the right is positive, so depending on the magnitude of the second term, the
exporter might need positive collateral to satisfy its cash ￿ ow constraint. This ￿nding arises from
the greater risk faced by the exporter in its foreign market, and shows that it is quite possible for
the cash ￿ ow constraint to be binding for the exporters but not for the domestic ￿rm, which is the
case we shall focus on.
When the cash ￿ ow constraint is not binding for the domestic ￿rm, that cuto⁄producer is again




d)) = 0; leading to the solution (25) as
before. But the cuto⁄ productivity for the exporter is now determined by the binding cash ￿ ow
16constraint, CFe (x
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: The credit constraint for ex-
porters ￿e still enters (34), and a tightening of this constraint raises x
ﬂ
e and reduces the extensive
margin of exports, as we found previously. But this negative e⁄ect on the extensive margin is now
o⁄set by the exporter having higher collateral k in (34), as we shall test empirically.
3 Estimating Equation and Data
3.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
We can use our results above to derive a linear relationship between expected interest payments
and expected revenue of the ￿rm, where the coe¢ cients of this linear relationship depend on the
credit constraints faced by domestic ￿rms and exporters. This equation will be tested using data
on Chinese ￿rms.
To derive this relationship, start with domestic ￿rms. The loans Md(x)=￿ are needed to ￿nance
total costs, so Md(x)=￿ ￿Cd are needed for variable costs. The ratio of expected marginal revenue
to marginal costs is ￿d; and the ratio of price to marginal revenue for CES demand is ￿=(￿ ￿ 1).
Therefore, the total expected sales revenue sdpdqd obtained from the working-capital loans of Md(x)
are sdpdqd = [Md(x)=￿ ￿ Cd]￿d￿=(￿ ￿ 1):
In our data we will not observe total loans to ￿rms, but rather, total interest payments. From
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17A similar line of argument will show that the relationship between expected revenue and loans for












￿e + ￿(1 ￿ ￿e) ￿ 1
￿ Cd ￿ Ce
￿
;
where the ￿rst line follows from the fact that the exporter faces the credit constraint of ￿e in the
domestic and export markets; and the second equality from (27).
To summarize the above relations, let us denote the expected payments to the bank, the expected
revenue and ￿xed costs as,
E (I(x)) =
￿



























Cd + Ce if x 2 [x
ﬂ
e;1]:
For convenience, we have included collateral in our de￿nition of bank payments in (36), but in the
estimation will separate these variables. In addition, de￿ne 1fx￿x
ﬂ eg as an indicator variable which
takes one for x ￿x
ﬂ
e and zero otherwise. Using these various de￿nitions, we obtain a linear relation
between expected revenue and bank payments for ￿rm j in year t,
Ejt (r(x)) = ￿0C + ￿1C1fxjt￿x
ﬂ eg + ￿2Ejt (I(x)) + ￿3Ejt (I(x))1fxjt￿x
ﬂ eg + ￿4i1fxjt￿x
ﬂ eg; (37)
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18The coe¢ cients ￿0 and ￿1 are negative because higher ￿xed costs reduce the amount of the loan
available to cover variable costs, and therefore reduce expected revenue. The coe¢ cient ￿2, which
multiplies the bank payments, is positive, indicating that a larger payments are associated with
larger revenue. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient ￿3, which multiplies the interaction between bank
payments and the export indicator, is negative provided that ￿(1 ￿ ￿e) < 1; ￿e ￿ ￿d; ￿e > ￿d and
i > 0; so that ￿e > ￿d. This negative coe¢ cient reduces the sales revenue for exporters given any
bank payments, re￿ ecting the extra credit constraint imposed on them. But notice that exporters
having higher default risk than domestic ￿rms, (1￿￿e) > (1￿￿d), will also contribute to reducing
￿3 (making it more negative), similar to the impact of the credit constraints ￿e > ￿d:
Finally, the coe¢ cient ￿4 is negative provided that ￿e > ￿d and ￿d=Cd > ￿e=Ce. Notice that
in the estimating equation (37), ￿4 < 0 multiplies the interest rate time the export indicator, so
higher interest rates ￿re￿ ecting greater opportunity cost for bank loans ￿are associated with lower
revenue for exporters. The presence of this term can be traced back to ￿ in (27), which determined
the interest payments for the cuto⁄ exporter. As interest rates rise, or the time-lag for exports
increases, the bank faces higher opportunity costs in making export loans and passes these on as
higher interest payments, thereby reducing the extensive margin of exports. It follows that revenue
relative to interest payments falls for exporters.
The structural equation (37) is derived from our model and does not have any error term: it
is an exact linear relation between the variables. But an error term will be implied by the fact
that the coe¢ cients ￿ = (￿0;:::;￿4) depend on other structural parameters, and so do the variables
themselves. For example, an increase in domestic ￿rms￿default probability (1 ￿ ￿d) reduces the
coe¢ cient ￿2; while an increase in exporters￿default probability (1￿￿e) reduces ￿3; so that revenue
falls for any payments to the bank. These results are due to the interest payments in (23) and (27).
We see from those conditions that a fall in ￿d or ￿e leads to higher payments E (I(x)) to the bank:
i.e. if ￿rms are less likely to repay the loan then the bank charges more to the cuto⁄ domestic ￿rm
and exporter, so an increase in the default rate is similar to a tightening of the credit constraints
in this respect.11
Besides the default rate, another parameter that surely varies a great deal across ￿rms is ￿;
which is the fraction of total costs that must be covered by loans. At the outset we suggested that
11But in contrast to the credit constraints, the default rate does not a⁄ect loans to ￿rms in (20). It follows that
while expected payments to the bank goes up as default rises, the ￿rm￿ s sales revenue is not a⁄ected.
19￿ could re￿ ect the capital intensity of sectors and ￿rms, and this idea will be con￿rmed by an initial
look at the data below (Figure 1). In our model, an rise in ￿ increases the credit constraints in (19)
when i > 0; which lowers the amounts Md(x)=￿ and Me(x)=￿ in (20) and therefore reduces expected
revenue. Interest payments are pulled in opposite directions as ￿ rises while Md(x)=￿ falls in (35),
but we can verify that the structural parameters ￿2 and ￿3 both fall: given interest payments, ￿rm
are selling less and the extra credit constraint on exporters is tighter in sectors with the greatest
need for loans.
It follows that we should write the structural parameters in (37) as depending on the identity
of ￿rms, ￿j:12 Summarizing all the right-hand side variables as Xjt and expected sales as yjt; the
estimating equation is yjt = Xjt￿j: In order to consistently estimate the population averages ￿, we
re-write this equation as,
yjt = Xjt￿ + ujt; where ujt ￿ Xjt(￿j ￿ ￿): (39)
This is an example of a panel model with random coe¢ cients, but we cannot assume that Xjt are
independent of ujt: from our discussion just above, di⁄erences in ￿j across ￿rms in￿ uence both
the parameters ￿j and Xjt: So we have a panel model with random coe¢ cients and endogenous
regressors, as analyzed by Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2008). To obtain consistent estimates of
the population averages ￿; they recommend a ￿xed e⁄ects-instrumental variable estimator, such as
FE-2SLS, as we shall use. We will need an instrumental variable that is uncorrelated with variations
in model parameters across ￿rms ￿such as the default rates ￿d and ￿e or the need for loans ￿ ￿but
correlated with the variation in interest payments that does not re￿ ect these parameters. For this
purpose we will use total factor productivity (TFP) of ￿rms. The measurement of this variable is
discussed below.
3.2 Firm-level Data
The sample used in this paper comes from a rich Chinese ￿rm-level panel data set which covers
more than 160,000 manufacturing ￿rms per year for the years 2000-2008. The number of ￿rms
doubled from 162,885 in 2000 to 412,212 in 2008.13 The data are collected and maintained by
12Variation in ￿ over time, such as due to changes in the default rate, will be introduced explicitly into the
estimation.
13Data in 2008, which is still not formally released and only available in a trial version, do not have information on
￿rm￿ s ID. So we use other available common variables to merge with data on 2007 and obtain 336,480 observations,
which is almost identical to number of observations in 2007 (i.e., 336,768 ￿rms).
20China￿ s National Bureau of Statistics in an annual survey of manufacturing enterprises.14 It covers
two types of manufacturing ￿rms: (1) all state-owned enterprises (SOEs); (2) non-SOEs whose
annual sales are more than ￿ve million Renminbi (which is equivalent to around $735,000 under
current exchange rate). The non-SOEs can be either multinationals or not. The data set includes
more than 100 ￿nancial variables listed in the main accounting sheets of all these ￿rms.
Although this data set contains rich information, a few variables in the data set are noisy and
misleading due, in large part, to the mis-reporting by some ￿rms.15 We hence clean the sample
and rule out outliers by using the following criteria: ￿rst, the key ￿nancial variables (such as total
assets, net value of ￿xed assets, sales, gross value of industrial output) cannot be missing; otherwise
those observations are dropped. Secondly, the number of employees hired for a ￿rm must not be less
than 10 people.16 In addition, following Cai and Liu (2009), and guided by the General Accepted
Accounting Principles, we delete observations if any of the following rules are violated: (i) the total
assets must be higher than the liquid assets; (ii) the total assets must be larger than the total
￿xed assets; (iii) the total assets must be larger than the net value of the ￿xed assets; (iv) a ￿rm￿ s
identi￿cation number cannot be missing and must be unique; and (v) the established time must be
valid. In particular, observations in which the opening year is after 2008 or the opening month is
later than December or earlier than January are dropped as well.
Since multinationals potentially stand out in the data, we treated them specially. We ￿rst con-
struct a dummy for multinationals to distinguish foreign from non-foreign ￿rms.17 In a robustness
check, we consider a broader classi￿cation of multinationals by including the Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan
(H/M/T)-invested ￿rms.18 For SOEs, the number was small enough (41,092 or 3.8% of the sample)
that we decided to drop them from the estimation.
After this rigorous ￿lter, we obtain a sample of 1;158;359 observations from the original sample
14Indeed, aggregated data on the industrial sector in the annual China￿ s Statistical Yearbook by the Natural Bureau
of Statistics (NBS) are compiled from this dataset.
15For example, information on some family-based ￿rms, which usually did not set up formal accounting systems,
is based on a unit of one Renminbi, whereas the o¢ cial requirement is a unit of 1,000 Renminbi. Holz (2004) o⁄ers
careful scrunity on possible measurement problems in Chinese data, especially on the aggregated level.
16Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest covering all Chilean plants with at least 10 workers, and we follow their
criterion.
17Speci￿cally, multinationals include the following: foreign-invested joint-stock corporations (code: 310), foreign-
invested joint venture enterprises (320), fully foreign-invested enterprise (330), and foreign-invested limited corpora-
tions (340).
18Speci￿cally, the H/M/T-owned ￿rms includes the following ￿rms: H/M/T/ joint-stock corporations (code: 210),
H/M/T joint venture enterprises (220), fully H/M/T-invested enterprises (230), and H/M/T-invested limited corpo-
rations (240).
21of 2;235;438, which accounts for around a half of the original data set during years 2000-2008.
As shown in Table 1, during years 2000-2008, multinationals accounts for 10.4% of total ￿rms but
increases to 21.1% if including investment from H/M/T. On average, foreign ￿rms have higher
revenue and more interest payment than domestic ￿rms. Similarly, exporting ￿rms, which account
for 28.5% in the sample, also have higher revenue and more interest payment than ￿rms that only
sell products domestically.
In addition to the ￿rm-level production data, we rely on another highly disaggregated product-
level trade data obtained from Chinese Customs, which records information such as types of ship-
ments and their export values, to merge with the ￿rm-level data set. To date, researchers have
faced technical challenges to merge the two data sets. Although they both report and identi￿cation
number for ￿rms, the coding system in each data set is completely di⁄erent. Hence, we rely instead
on the zip code and the last seven digits of a ￿rm￿ s phone number to merge the data.19
3.3 Measure of TFP
We use the augmented Olley-Pakes (1996) approach to estimate and calculate the ￿rms￿TFP. This
method is applied to our dataset of Chinese ￿rms as follows.20 First, given that the measure of
TFP requires real terms of ￿rm￿ s inputs (labor and capital) and output, we ￿rst adopt di⁄erent
price de￿ ators for inputs and outputs. Data on input de￿ ators and output de￿ ators are directly
from Brandt et al. (2009) in which the output de￿ ators are constructed using "reference price"
information from China￿ s Statistical Yearbooks whereas input de￿ ators are constructed based on
output de￿ ators and China￿ s national input-output table (2002).21 Second, we use de￿ ated ￿rm￿ s
value-added to measure production since we do not include intermediate inputs (materials) as one
kind of factor input. This is important because processing trade in China accounts for more than
a half of its total trade since 1995. The prices of imported intermediate inputs are di⁄erent from
those of domestic intermediate inputs. Using China￿ s domestic de￿ ator to measure its imported
intermediate input would raise another unnecessary estimation bias.22
Third, it is essential to construct the real investment variable when using the Olley-Pakes (1996)
19Yu (2010) provides a more detailed description of the merging of the two data sets.
20Additional technical details of the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach are available on request, and also discussed in
Yu (2010).
21Such data can be accessed via http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
22Note that we are not able to use value-added to estimate ￿rm￿ s TFP in 2008 which is absent in the current trial
version of the data set. We instead use industrial output to replace value-added, which raises a possible upward bias
for the estimated capital coe¢ cients and hence a possible downward bias for the TFP.
22approach. As usual, we adopt the perpetual inventory method to investigate the law of motion for
real capital and real investment. Rather than assigning an arbitrary number for the depreciation
ratio, we use the exact ￿rm￿ s real depreciation provided by the Chinese ￿rm-level data set. Last but
not least, given China￿ s WTO accession in 2001, which was a positive demand shock for China￿ s
exports, we also include a WTO dummy in the Olley-Pakes estimation to capture the e⁄ect of the
WTO accession.
Columns (1)-(2) of Table 2 reports the estimated elasticity coe¢ cient of labor and capital for the
thirty China￿ s manufacturing sectors coded from 13 to 42, according to China￿ s adjusted industrial
classi￿cations (GB/T4754), which were adopted in 2002.23 Using data from 2000-2007, on average,
the estimated elasticity for labor is .399 and for capital is .278. The average (natural) logarithm
of China￿ s TFP is 4.214 over the period of 2000-2007.24 We then separate all ￿rms in the sample
to two groups: domestic ￿rms which only sell their products at home, and exporting ￿rms which
sell their products both at home and abroad. Overall, the logarithm of TFP for domestic ￿rms
(4.258) is slightly smaller than its counterpart for exporting ￿rms (4.196). Columns (3)-(4) of Table
2 presents the estimated TFP for domestic ￿rms and exporting ￿rms by manufacturing sectors.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Credit Constraint
In Figure 1 we show ￿rm revenue and interest payments, taking the average over the years 2000-2008
and over 2-digit manufacturing sectors. There is a clear positive relationship between the two, as
implied by our model. But we also see that some industries have higher interest payments relative
to sales revenue than others. For example, some capital-intensive industries such as manufacture
of chemical ￿bers (code in Figure 1: 28) and tobacco (code: 16) are below the diagonal, while
other labor-intensive industries like computers and other electronic equipment (code: 40) are above
the diagonal. These observations justify our argument that the capital-intensity of production
in￿ uences ￿ in our model, thereby making the coe¢ cients in (37) random across ￿rms and the
regressors endogneous. For that reason we use FE-2SLS when estimating (39), using ￿rm TFP and
its interactions with other variables as the instuments.25
23Firm data before 2002 were clustered into industrial data by adopting the old industrial classi￿cation. We concord
such data so that they are consistent with data after 2002.
24As presented in Table 1, the average log of TFP is 4.211 over the period of 2000-2008.
25We have also adopted a one-period lag of TFP as the instrument for interest payments, and obtained very similar
results to using current TFP.
23Table 3 ￿rst reports the OLS estimates of (39) in column (1) and then the 2SLS estimates
in the remaining columns, where for simplicity, we do not include ￿xed costs or collateral in this
initial speci￿cation. There are four endogenous variables in the estimation: (1) the ￿rms￿interest
payment; (2) an interaction term between the interest payment and the export indicator; (3) an
interaction term between the interest payment and the foreign ￿rm indicator; and (4) the triple
interaction between the interest payment, export indicator and foreign ￿rm indicator. Accordingly,
we adopt four instruments here: the level of ￿rm￿ s TFP (xit); the interaction term between ￿rm￿ s
TFP and the foreign indicator; the interaction term between ￿rm￿ s TFP and the export indicator;
and the interaction term between ￿rm￿ s TFP, export indicator, and foreign ￿rm indicator.
The OLS estimates in column (1) perform poorly, yielding coe¢ cients that are smaller than the
2SLS estimates and sometimes of opposite sign. This is to be expected from a model with random
coe¢ cient and endogenous regressors. In contrast, the 2SLS coe¢ cients are relatively stable in
columns (2)-(5), which di⁄er by the use of ￿rm-speci￿c random e⁄ects and the interaction between
the export indicator and the industry-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Column (5) is special because we have
excluded from the sample about 10% of ￿rms that only export, which is inconsistent with our
model.
In all 2SLS estimates we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient of interest payment, ^ ￿2, is positive whereas
the coe¢ cient of the interaction between interest payment and export indicator, ^ ￿3, is signi￿cantly
negative but smaller in absolute value than ^ ￿2.26 Thus, after controlling for random coe¢ cients
and endogenous regressors, our estimates con￿rm the predictions in our theoretical model: higher
interest payments lead to greater ￿rm revenue, though interest payments have a smaller positive
e⁄ect on the revenue for exporters than for non-exporters. This con￿rms that additional credit
constraints are imposed on exporters.
The export indicator itself also has a negative coe¢ cient in columns (2)-(5), which corresponds
to a combination of ^ ￿1 and ^ ￿4 in (37), i.e. it combines the coe¢ cient of the export indicator times
￿xed costs and the coe¢ cient of the export indicator itself. In Table 3 we have not explicitly
introduced ￿xed costs, so we cannot distinguish these two variables. Both coe¢ cients are expected
to be negative in the model, which is con￿rmed by the negative coe¢ cient on the export indicator
found in columns (2)-(5).
26The only speci￿cation where we do not ￿nd this result is when ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are used (not reported
in Table 3), in which case the interaction between interest payments and the export indicator becomes insigni￿cant.
24The results in Table 3 also indicate that foreign ￿rms face a smaller credit constraint as compared
to domestic ￿rms, and that foreign exporting ￿rms do not face any additional credit constraint as
compared to foreign non-exporters. The ￿rst result is shown by the negative coe¢ cient on the
interaction between the interest payment and the foreign indicator, which is signi￿cant when ￿rm
random e⁄ects are used. The second result is shown by the positive coe¢ cient on the triple
interaction between the interest payment, export indicator and foreign indicator, which is large
enough to fully o⁄set the negative coe¢ cient on the interest payment times the export indicator.
In other words, exporting ￿rms face an additional credit constraint, but not if they are foreign
exporting ￿rms. These results con￿rm the ￿ndings of Manova, Wei and Zhang (2009) that the
credit constraint is weaker for multinational ￿rms in China
Several tests are performed to verify the validity of our instruments, which are TFP and its
interactions with the indicator variables. First, to check whether such instruments are "relevant",
we use the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) LM ￿2 statistic to check whether the instruments are correlated
with the endogenous variables. As shown in columns (2)-(3) of Table 3, the null hypothesis that
the model is under-identi￿ed is rejected at the 1% signi￿cance level. Second, the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) F statistic provides strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the ￿rst stage is weakly
identi￿ed at a highly signi￿cance level. Finally, the ￿rst-stage estimation results shown in the lower
module of Table 3 o⁄er strong evidence to justify the validity of such instruments. In particular, in
columns (2)-(5), the t-values of the four endogenous regressors are highly statistically signi￿cant. In
addition, the excluded F statistics in the ￿rst stage are also signi￿cant.27 These tests give su¢ cient
evidence that the instruments perform well, and therefore, the speci￿cation is well justi￿ed both
theoretically and statistically.
4.2 Impact of the Financial Crisis
It is believed that the global ￿nancial crisis in 2008 had a signi￿cant negative impact on global
trade. With the ￿nancial crisis, it is presumably more di¢ cult for a ￿rm to access loans from
￿nancial intermediates, which in turn shrinks their exports and total revenue. We can add year
indicators to our speci￿cation to test this hypothesis for our sample of Chinese ￿rms.
27In addition, we performed extra auxiliary regressions to check for the "exclusive restriction" of the instruments.
To show that the instruments a⁄ect the regressand through and only through the endogenous variables, we follow
previous work in running regressions of instruments on the residual obtained in the second-stage estimation. It turns
out that the coe¢ cients of these instruments are all highly insigni￿cant which, to some extent, excludes other possible
channels. These results are available on request.
25The impact of the ￿nancial crisis in our model can show up in two ways. First, the coe¢ cient
￿4 < 0 in (37) is multiplied by the interest rate i, which re￿ ects the added opportunity cost to
banks from giving loans to exporting ￿rms that take longer to repay. We allow for changes in the
interest rate by using a year indicator interacted with the export indicator, and rising interest rates
should show up as a negative interaction. The ￿4 coe¢ cient also depends on the share of sales to
the domestic market, ￿d; and ￿4 falls further (becomes more negative) as export markets shrink
and the domestic market is relatively more important.
There is a second way that the ￿nancial crisis can show up, however, and that is through the
credit constraints themselves, i.e. the coe¢ cients ￿2 > 0 and ￿3 < 0 of the interest payment and
interest payment times export indicator. These coe¢ cients in (37) re￿ ect the credit constraints
de￿ned by (19), and it can be con￿rmed that both coe¢ cients are falling in the interest rate. There
is an o⁄setting e⁄ect on ￿3; however, and that is through a rising share in the domestic market,
￿d; which increases ￿3 (moving it towards zero). The intuition here is that if exporters look more
like domestic ￿rms by increasing sales in the home market, then the bank will not impose as large
of an "extra" credit constraint on the exporters. So the expected change in ￿3 is ambiguous in
theory, and we will evaluate it empirically by including a year indicator interacted with the interest
payment times export indicator.
The results from these speci￿cations are shown in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) are a single
regression, which includes both types of year interactions: the interactions with the export indicator
in column (1), and the interaction with interest payments times the export indicator in column (2).
The coe¢ cients on the year￿export interaction in column (1) are negative in all years (omitting
2000), but not signi￿cantly so until 2008, when a very large value of -184,579 is obtained. Revenue
is measured in thousands of US$, so this coe¢ cient indicates a drop in revenue of $185 million for
the typical exporting ￿rm. That is much too large taken on its own, because the typical exporting
￿rm has revenue of $24 million over the entire sample (Table 1) and $41 million in 2008. But this
apparent drop in revenue is o⁄set by the positive coe¢ cients on the year￿export￿interest payment
interactions in column (2), especially in 2008. We argued above that contracting foreign markets
could lead to a positive coe¢ cient on this interaction as the extra credit constraint on exporters is
relaxed (because they look more like domestic ￿rms), as we ￿nd strongly for 2008. But we believe
that there is enough collinearity between the two types of year interactions in this regression that
we may not be accurately measuring the e⁄ects of each one.
26Accordingly, we simplify by considering only the year￿export interactions, as shown in column
(3).28 In that case we ￿nd a negative coe¢ cient in only one year, 2008, of -8,046, indicating a drop
in export revenue of $8 million for the typical exporting ￿rm. That represents about one-￿fth of
average revenue for exporters in 2008, which is our estimate of the impact of the ￿nancial crisis in
that year. Note, however, that this estimate combines any increase in the interest rate with the
drop in foreign market share, so we have not identi￿ed a pure e⁄ect of credit constraints. Also, the
drop in revenue of one-￿fth holds ￿xed the interest paid by ￿rms; it could equally well be the case
that loans and interest payments rise, which would o⁄set some of this drop in revenue.
A ￿nal set of estimates reported in Table 4 keeps the year￿exporter interactions, in column
(4), and adds the additional year￿exporter￿foreign ￿rm interactions, in column (5). Here we are
interested in seeing how the ￿nancial crisis impacted foreign exporting ￿rms versus non-foreign
exporters. Our estimates in column (4) show that revenue for non-foreign exporters is reduced
by $15.3 million, or about two-￿fths of those ￿rms￿average revenue in 2008. In contrast, foreign
exporters seem not to be a⁄ected by the credit constraint.29 The ￿nding that non-foreign exporters
were hit more by the crisis is consistent, once again, with the idea that multinational ￿rms can
raise internal ￿nance from their parent company or a¢ liates to avoid the negative shock of credit
constraints during the crisis.
4.3 Fixed Costs and Collateral
So far our estimates in Tables 3 and 4 abstract from the role of ￿xed costs and collateral. But as
seen from (37), ￿rms with higher ￿xed costs are expected to have lower revenue, via the coe¢ cients
￿0 < 0 and ￿1 < 0. This e⁄ect arises because the bank loan covers both ￿xed costs and variable
costs, so higher ￿xed costs reduce the funds to ￿nance production. In addition to ￿xed costs,
collateral also enters the estimating equation as a substitute for interest payments, as seen in in
(36). Since ￿2 > 0; collateral is positively associated with revenue, but with ￿3 < 0; that e⁄ect is
smaller for exporters.
We follow Manova (2008) by using the ￿rm￿ s tangible assets as a measure of collateral. When
28When instead we use only the year￿export￿interest payment interactions (not reported), we ￿nd that the
coe¢ cients are positive for all years after 2000, but no longer show the abrupt increase in 2008 that we ￿nd on
column (2) of Table 4.
29Notice that the positive coe¢ cients on the year￿export￿foreign ￿rm interactions at the bottom of column (5)
are o⁄set by the negative coe¢ cient of -24,239 on the export￿foreign ￿rm interaction, so the net impact on foreign
￿rms is small in most years.
27tangible assets are entered as a level, the results are quite erratic. One reason for this might be that
we do not have estimates of the default probability that multiplies collateral in (36), so that our
collateral variable is measured with error. Rather than use the level of tangible assets, we instead
measure them as a percentage of total assets, which leads to more stable results.
Table 5 reports the 2SLS estimates with ￿xed costs and collateral. In all regressions, ￿rm￿ s
"overhead costs" are used as a measure of ￿rm￿ s ￿xed costs.30 Columns (1) and (2) use the ￿rm-
speci￿c random e⁄ects without and with year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, column (3) adds the industry-
speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, and column (4) also includes the interactions between the export indicator and
industry-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Most of the results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Firms with higher overhead costs are associated with lower revenue, whereas ￿rms with more
collateral, as measured by tangible assets, have higher revenue.
When interacting these terms with the export indicator, tangible assets raises revenue slightly
less for exporters, as expected from our model. We also expected that higher overhead costs
would lower revenue somewhat more for exporters, but that is not the case in the estimation. On
the contrary, the positive coe¢ cient on overhead cost￿export indicator just o⁄sets the negative
coe¢ cient on overhead cost itself, so it appears that this measure of ￿xed costs has no impact at
all on revenue for exporting ￿rms. Admittedly, using overhead costs as a measure for ￿xed costs is
subject to error, and perhaps that error is particularly severe for exporters.
4.4 Selection and Alternative Speci￿cations
Tables 3-5 use the export indicator itself and interacted with other variables, but that variable
is itself endogenous. To control for this, we introduce a selection equation that estimates the
probability of a ￿rm to export based on TFP and other structural variables. We then experiment
using this predicted probability as an alternative to the export indicator.
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where Vjt denotes a latent variable faced by ￿rm j. Its distribution is the distribution of ￿rm￿ s
TFP shifted to the left by the export cuto⁄ productivity. We model this cuto⁄ productivity as
30In the accounting de￿nition, overhead costs refer to an ongoing expenses of operating a business that cannot be
immediately associated with the products or services being o⁄ered. They include all costs on the income statement
except for direct labor, direct materials & direct expenses. Thus, overhead costs include accounting fees, advertising,
depreciation, insurance, interest, legal fees, rent, repairs, supplies, taxes, telephone bills, travel and utilities costs.
28depending on the logarithm of ￿rm￿ s tangible assets lnTangjt; a foreign indicator FORjt; year
indicators Dt and interactions between the logarithm of tangible assets and year indicator. Thus,
the latent variable Vjt depends on these variables as well as TFP xjt:






￿5tDt ￿ lnTangjt + ￿jt;
where ￿jt is normally distributed. We can estimate the selection function by the Probit model:
Pr(Exportjt = 1) = Pr(Vjt > 0) (40)







where ￿(:) is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. We use the predicted
export probabilities from this regression to replace the export indicator.
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the selection equation (40) using the probit model
over the entire sample. We see that ￿rms with higher TFP have a higher probability of exporting.
In addition, ￿rms with higher tangible assets are more likely to export, which is consistent with
our theoretical results: having greater collateral will relax the cash ￿ ow constraint, especially for
exporters. Foreign ￿rms are also more likely to export, which is consistent with the idea that
they are able to access external ￿nance from their parent company. Interestingly, the included
year indicators after 2000 are negative and rise in absolute value, which suggests that some time-
dependent variables not captured explicitly in the model (e.g., Renminbi appreciation after 2005)
reduced the probability of ￿rm￿ s exporting. Finally, the interaction between the year indicators
and tangible assets have very small negative coe¢ cients in 2002-2005, but positive coe¢ cients in
2006-2008, indicating that in the later years the role of tangible assets in relaxing the cash-￿ ow
constraint for exporters became more important. One explanation for this result from our model
is that the probability of default increased in later years, in which case collateral become more
important in (34).
While Table 6 gives a summary of the estimation of the Probit model for the entire sample,
we re-estimated that equation by 2-digit industries, and use the estimated probability of exporting
to replace the export indicator in our basic regression. The results are shown in Table 7. The
magnitude of the coe¢ cients in each column are close to their counterparts in Table 3. In particular,
￿rms with higher interest payment generate larger revenue, though the interest payment has smaller
29e⁄ect on revenue for exporters than for purely domestic ￿rms. These results con￿rm that the
endogeneity of the export decision was not biasing our earlier results.
As a second speci￿cation test, we consider breaking up exports into their mode of transport, as
done by Amiti and Weinstein (2009). Our theory suggests that exporters are more constrained than
domestic ￿rms due, in part, to the longer time needed for export shipments. In reality, ￿rms would
have many types of shipments: by air, by sea, by truck, and by their combination. Usually sea
shipment is the slowest and expected to have a longer time-lag on export payment. It is reasonable
to suspect that if a ￿rm relies more on sea shipment, it would then face more stringent credit
constraints.
To test this hypothesis, we merged the Chinese ￿rm-level trade data, which have detailed
information on types of shipments, with Chinese ￿rm-level production data. The time span of
￿rm-level trade data is from 2000 to 2006, so it ends two years earlier than that of the production
data. In addition, while we know which ￿rms are exporters in the production data, there are many
cases in which such ￿rms cannot be merged with any record in the trade data. These ￿rms are
dropped, thereby reducing the sample further. To see the impacts of these sample reductions, we
￿rst use the ￿rm-level production data alone to run the basic regression over 2000-2006 without
merging with the trade data, which is reported in column (1) in Table 8. The sample of 1,117,267
observations in 2000-2008, used in Table 3, is reduced to a sample of 742,234 observations due to the
omitted years 2007-2008. The regression in column (1), Table 8, carries the same message as Table
3: higher interest payments lead to higher revenue, though the impact is smaller for exporters.
Columns (2)-(5) of Table 8 report the results when the trade data are merged with the produc-
tion data, causing further reduction of the sample. Column (2) has the same qualitative features as
column (1), indicating limited impacts of dataset merge and loss of observations. Columns (3)-(5)
report the estimates for di⁄erent groups of ￿rms of di⁄erent shares of sea shipments. Comparing
these di⁄erent groups of ￿rms (i.e., ￿rms with sea shipment share >50%, >95%, and >99%), we
see that ￿rms with larger share of sea shipments tend to be more credit constrained, as indicated by
the rising coe¢ cients of the interest payment￿export interactions (from 77.46 to 91.66 to 94.79).
These ￿ndings are consistent with our hypothesis that exporters are more credit constrained due
to the longer time needed for export shipments.
305 Conclusions
In this paper, we have asked why ￿rms will face credit constraints on their domestic sales and
exports. We rely on the idea that ￿rms must obtain working capital prior to production and that
their productivity is private information. From the revelation principle, the bank can do no better
than to o⁄er loan and interest schedule that lead the ￿rms to truthfully reveal this information.
We argue that such incentive-compatible schedules will lead to credit constraints on the ￿rms. The
reason for this is that a ￿rm that is not credit constrained would su⁄er only a second-order loss
in pro￿ts by producing slightly less and borrowing less, but would have a ￿rst-order reduction in
interest payments. Thus, such a ￿rm would never truthfully reveal its productivity and produce at
the ￿rst-best.
We have built into the model three reasons why export sales di⁄er from domestic sales: due to
a longer time-lag in exports between production and sales; due to a greater risk in exports; and
due to additional ￿xed costs of exports. Our results show that the ￿rst of these reasons ￿the
time needed for the loan ￿is most important in determining the credit constraints. This reason
leads banks to impose a more stringent credit constraint on exporters, for both their exports and
domestic sales, than on purely domestic ￿rms. The more stringent credit constraint reduces both
the intensive margin and the extensive margin of exports. The second reason, greater risk, enters
due to the project risk of a ￿rm not being paid or the default risk of the ￿rm not repaying the
bank. The risk also a⁄ects the credit extended by banks, but in di⁄erent directions. We ￿nd
that greater project risk in exports leads ￿rms to optimally hold back on foreign sales, while the
bank correspondingly reduces its loans and interest payments. In contrast, greater default risk by
exporters leads to higher expected interest payments. Extra ￿xed costs further reduce the extensive
margin of exports when the cash ￿ ow constraint is binding, but higher expected collateral held by
exporters o⁄sets this constraint and raises the extensive margin.
Our theoretical result that the exports and domestic sales of an exporting ￿rm should face the
same credit constraint corresponds most closely to the empirical ￿nding of Behrens, Corcos and
Mion (2010) for Belgium, who show that ￿nancial variables impact both types of sales equally
within a ￿rm. This contrasts to the empirical ￿ndings of Amiti and Weinstein (2009) for Japan,
who show that the health of the main bank has a ￿ve-times greater impact on ￿rm-level exports
than domestic sales. One reason for this di⁄erence is that Amiti and Weinstein (2009) are arguably
31capturing the "trade ￿nance" activities of these banks, targeted speci￿cally at exports, whereas
our model and empirical work deals with working-capital loans in general, as noted above.
We note that one limitation of our model is that it is static, whereas other theoretical literature
focuses on the dynamic characteristics of credit constraints. Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) char-
acterize incentive-compatible credit constraints in a dynamic model, and show how such constraints
a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s growth and survival. In this setting, a ￿rm￿ s credit constraint is relaxed when it in-
creases its cash ￿ ow. Midrigan and Xu (2009) take a model of this type and apply it to plant-level
data for Colombia and South Korea. Gross and Verani (2010) show how the ￿rm revenue function
used in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) can arise from a Melitz-style model, and drawing on Verani
(2010), solve for the dynamics of domestic and exporting ￿rms. None of these papers, however,
introduce the distinctions between domestic ￿rms and exporters ￿in the time-lag of shipments and
default risk ￿that we use here. We anticipate that our results would apply in some form to these
dynamic models, too, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Several other extensions merit special consideration. One of them is to endogenize the internal
￿nance via multinational corporation a l￿ Antr￿s et al. (2009). Another possible extension is to
consider outward foreign direct investment (FDI) into the model in the sense that ￿rms with higher
productivity would perform outward FDI in addition to exports. A third would be to measure the
welfare costs of the credit constraints derived here, as done by Midrigan and Xu (2009) for plants
in Colombia and South Korea. Indeed, the credit constraints we have identi￿ed could explain part
of the deadweight losses in Chinese manufacturing identi￿ed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). These
are all interesting topics to explore in future research.
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34Table 1: Basic Statistics for Key Variables (2000-2008)
Variables Mean Std.Dev.
Firm￿ s Revenue ($1,000) 12,660 136,812
Domestic Firm￿ s Revenue ($1,000) 8,157 60,615
Export Firm￿ s Revenue ($1,000) 23,916 236,948
Foreign Firm￿ s Revenue ($1,000) 21,163 160,212
Firm￿ s Interest Payment ($1,000) 138.5 1,657
Domestic Firm￿ s Interest Payment ($1,000) 83.98 802.6
Export Firm￿ s Interest Payment ($1,000) 274.9 2,825
Foreign Firm￿ s Interest Payment ($1,000) 133.4 1,669
Log of TFP (Olley-Pakes) 4.211 1.135
Log of Firm￿ s Real Capital 8.30 1.68
Log of Capital-Labor Ratio 3.56 1.32
Firm￿ s Revenue-Cost Ratio 1.05 8.67
Interest Payment ￿ Export Indicator 78.56 1,515
Export Value ($1,000) 2,478 69,160
Export Value ($1,000) Conditional on Exporting 8,673 129,174
Export Indicator .285 .451
Estimated Export Probability .285 .199
State-owned Firm Dummy .035 .184
Foreign Firm Indicator (exclusive H/M/T) .104 .306
Foreign Firm Indicator (inclusive H/M/T) .211 .408
Notes: There are 1,158,359 observations in the sample. Firms revenue and interest payment are converted to
dollar using the exchange rate (1 dollar=8.05 Renminbi on average). SOEs dummy equals one for pure state-owned
enterprises, stated-owned joint venture enterprises, state-owned and collective joint venture enterprises, and state-
own limited corporation ￿rms, and zero otherwise. There are 41,092 SOEs in the sample, which are dropped in the
regressions. All foreign (i.e.,multinational) ￿rms are de￿ned exclusive of those originating in Hong Kong, Macau, or
Taiwan (H/M/T), except in the ￿nal row of the table.
35Table 2: Total Factor Productivity of Chinese Plants (2000-2007)
Chinese Industrial Class￿cation (2-digit) Labor Capital Log of Log of
coe⁄. coe⁄. TFP for TFP for
Domestic Exporter
Processing of Foods (13) .447 .286 4.419 4.394
Manufacturing of Foods (14) .444 .309 3.980 4.027
Manufacture of Beverages (15) .474 .422 2.942 3.072
Manufacture of Tobacco (16) .416 .669 .667 1.315
Manufacture of Textile (17) .437 .203 4.760 4.863
Manufacture of Apparel, Footwear & Caps (18) .508 .184 4.527 4.448
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, & Feather (19) .474 .350 3.569 3.408
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood,
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm & Straw Products (20)
.446 .130 5.333 5.421
Manufacture of Furniture (21) .563 .231 4.051 3.951
Manufacture of Paper & Paper Products (22) .473 .276 4.005 4.260
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media (23) .413 .195 4.874 5.091
Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education
& Sport Activities (24)
.490 .168 4.813 4.773
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, &Fuel (25) .252 .282 5.213 6.188
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials (26) .313 .346 4.356 4.575
Manufacture of Medicines (27) .411 .208 5.265 5.548
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers (28) .382 .304 4.391 4.700
Manufacture of Rubber (29) .377 .308 4.242 4.303
Manufacture of Plastics (30) .421 .239 4.600 4.595
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral goods (31) .321 .422 3.577 3.778
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals (32) .464 .308 4.140 4.504
Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals (33) .362 .260 4.975 5.210
Manufacture of Metal Products (34) .420 .277 4.370 4.314
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery (35) .404 .282 4.386 4.459
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery (36) .406 .404 3.443 3.434
Manufacture of Transport Equipment (37) .466 .396 3.214 3.248
Electrical Machinery & Equipment (39) .453 .405 3.141 4.902
Computers & Other Electronic Equipment (40) .495 .192 5.074 3.658
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments & Ma-
chinery for Cultural Activity & O¢ ce Work (41)
.408 .411 3.426 3.597
Manufacture of Artwork (42) .460 .347 3.597 3.492
All industries .399 .278 4.258 4.196
Notes: We do not report standard errors for each coe¢ cient to save space, which are available upon request.
36Table 3: 2SLS Estimates (2000-2008) without Fixed Costs or Collateral
Regressand: Firm￿ s Revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Interest Payment 60.91** 217.5** 219.7** 217.5** 217.7**
(32.46) (17.30) (17.44) (38.24) (37.51)
Interest Payment￿Foreign Indicator -32.07** -41.20 -43.70 -41.20** -41.26**
(-5.95) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-4.20) (-4.12)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator 14.64** -69.98** -72.77** -69.98** -70.02**
(3.74) (-4.48) (-4.55) (-11.95) (-11.70)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator -1.31 95.98** 97.93** 95.98** 93.55**
￿Foreign Indicator (-.15) (2.17) (2.21) (9.39) (8.97)
Export Indicator 231.8 -10,860** -764.3 -10,860** -13,036**
(.30) (-4.32) (-.60) (-16.07) (-17.59)
Export Indicator￿Foreign Indicator 4,277** 387.9 -1,698 387.9 186.6
(3.38) (.06) (-.26) (.22) (.10)
Foreign Indicator 8,072** -3,775 -2,635 -3,775** -3770**
(12.97) (-.86) (-.60) (-2.51) (-2.40)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM ￿2 statistic ￿ 327.2y 326.8y ￿ ￿
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 14.78y 14.43y
Year-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Indicator￿Ind. Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes No No
Firm-Speci￿c Random E⁄ects No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,121,223 1,117,267 1,117,267 1,117,267 1,068,169
First-Stage Regressions
IV1: TFPOP
it ￿ .139** .135** .139** .139**
(7.37) (7.54) (20.82) (20.29)
[30.56] [31.95] ￿ ￿
IV2: TFPOP
it ￿Foreign Indicator ￿ .279** .280** .279** .279**
(4.66) (4.69) (39.35) (38.51)
[21.35] [21.67] ￿ ￿
IV3: TFPOP
it ￿Export Indicator ￿ .726** .003** .726** .731**
(2.36) (6.29) (65.39) (63.77)
[32.82] [36.48] ￿ ￿
IV4: TFPOP
it ￿Foreign Indicator ￿ .750** .752** .750** .768**
￿Export Indicator (7.52) (7.56) (89.91) (89.28)
[16.52] [20.85] ￿ ￿
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at
the 10(5) percent level. y indicates signi￿cance of p-value at the 1 percent level. Excluded F statistic in the ￿rst stage
are reported in square brackets. Column (5) drops 49,098 observations with pure exporters which exports equal total
sales.
In the ￿rst-stage regressions, IV1 reports the coe¢ cient of TFP (Olley-Pakes) level in the estimation using interest
payment as the regressand. Similarly, IV2 reports the coe¢ cient of the product between TFP level and foreign ￿rm
(FOR)￿ s dummy in the estimation using the product of interest payment and FOR as the regressand. IV3 reports
the coe¢ cient of the product between TFP level and export dummy in the estimation using the product of interest
payment and export dummy as the regressand. Finally, IV4 reports the coe¢ cient of the product among TFP level,
export dummy, foreign ￿rm￿ s dummy in the estimation using the product of interest payment, foreign dummy, and
export dummy as the regressand.
37Table 4: 2SLS Estimates (2000-2008) using Export Interactions by Year
Regressand: Firm￿ s Revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction with: Export Export Export Export Export
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator ￿Foreign
￿Interest Indicator
Interest Payment 210.7** 210.7** 210.7**
(17.59) (17.59) (17.59)
Interest Payment￿Foreign Indicator -39.13 -39.13 -39.13
(-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator -153.5** -66.14** -66.26**
(-4.39) (-4.34) (-4.35)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator 92.51** 94.74** 95.24**
￿Foreign Indicator (2.13) (2.17) (2.18)
Export Indicator 7,980 -7,737** -2,926
(1.20) (-2.54) (-1.10)
Export Indicator￿Foreign Indicator 10,563 -1,478 -24,239**
(1.06) (-.23) (-2.11)
Foreign Indicator -1,658 -1,658 -1,658
(-.38) (-.38) (-.38)
Interaction for 2001 -4,809 22.55 646.3 -698.1 5,886
(-.68) (.62) (.21) (-.28) (.52)
Interaction for 2002 -5,102 31.45 2,699 -1,157 17,999*
(-.71) (.84) (.98) (-.51) (1.80)
Interaction for 2003 -10,382 85.16** 7,555** 2,230 25,045**
(-1.53) (2.26) (2.96) (1.10) (2.67)
Interaction for 2004 -12,118* 97.11** 7,806** 2,030 26,510**
(-1.81) (2.57) (3.01) (.99) (2.82)
Interaction for 2005 -16,345** 104.3** 5,049** 726.0 20,659**
(-2.13) (2.43) (1.96) (.35) (2.21)
Interaction for 2006 -16,678** 95.51** 3,523 -1,207 22,343**
(-2.22) (2.44) (1.37) (-.57) (2.42)
Interaction for 2007 -16,986** 80.20** -208.4 -4,733** 21,574**
(-2.22) (2.17) (-.08) (-2.05) (2.33)
Interaction for 2008 -184,579** 429.0** -8,046* -15,341** 32,649**
(-2.01) (2.20) (1.93) (-3.25) (3.16)
Year-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,117,267 1,117,267 1,117,267
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at
the 10(5) percent level. The regression in columns (1) and (2) includes both export indicator￿year and export
indicator￿interest payment￿year interactions. Column (3) includes only export indicator￿year interactions. The
regression in columns (4) and (5) includes both export indicator￿year and export indicator￿foreign indicator￿year
interactions.
38Table 5: 2SLS Estimates (2000-2008) with Fixed Costs and Collateral
Regressand: Firm￿ s Revenue (1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest Payment 1,113** 1,116** 1,569** 1,688**
(5.78) (5.81) (4.07) (3.84)
Interest Payment￿Foreign Indicator -345.8** -350.8** -523.7** -571.9**
(-4.29) (-4.34) (-3.33) (-3.22)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator -943.3** -947.1** -1,382** -1,514**
(-4.89) (-4.92) (-3.58) (-3.44)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator 404.5** 408.4** 570.3** 623.6**
￿Foreign Indicator (4.97) (5.01) (3.67) (3.50)
Export Indicator 12,531 7,484 25,022 79,650**
(.45) (.27) (.62) (3.14)
Export Indicator￿Foreign Indicator -60,251** -60,772** -78,610** -84,133**
(-4.40) (-4.43) (-3.27) (-3.24)
Foreign Indicator 57,002** 57,412** 74,158** 27,522
(4.31) (4.34) (3.19) (.63)
Overhead Cost -212.2** -212.4** -307.1** -332.3**
(-5.21) (-5.24) (-3.74) (-3.59)
Overhead Cost￿Export Indicator 207.0** 207.3** 300.6** 326.7**
(5.08) (5.11) (3.67) (3.53)
Tangible Asset 392.2** 772.5** 126.0** 135.0**
(2.65) (4.42) (3.74) (3.61)
Tangible Asset￿Export Indicator -60.09 -15.66 -32.13 -39.53
(-.22) (-.06) (-.81) (-.92)
Year-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes
Export Dummy￿Ind. Fixed E⁄ects No No No Yes
Firm-Speci￿c Random E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,062,171 1,062,171 1,062,171 1,062,171
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at
the 10(5) percent level. Excluded F statistic in the ￿rst stage are reported in square brackets. Here ￿rm￿ s tangible
asset is measured in percentage by using its tangible assets over its total assets times 100.
39Table 6: The Probit Estimates of Firm￿ s Selection E⁄ects (2000-2008)
Variables Coe¢ cient Variables Coe¢ cient
TFP Level .019** Foreign Indicator .975**
(4.73) (240.1)
Log of Tangible Assets .129** Tangible Assets￿2001 ￿
(54.75) Interaction
Year Indicator in 2001 -1.91** Tangible Assets￿2002 -.011**
(-45.02) Interaction (-1.97)
Year Indicator in 2002 -1.79** Tangible Assets￿2003 -.004
(-44.00) Interaction (-.92)
Year Indicator in 2003 -1.87** Tangible Assets￿2004 -.0005
(-64.77) Interaction (-.11)
Year Indicator in 2004 -1.86** Tangible Assets￿2005 -.005
(-78.22) Interaction (-1.14)
Year Indicator in 2005 -1.88** Tangible Assets￿2006 .015**
(-78.63) Interaction (3.22)
Year Indicator in 2006 -2.14** Tangible Assets￿2007 .026**
(-93.41) Interaction (5.64)
Year Indicator in 2007 -2.37** Tangible Assets￿2008 .013**
(-107.8) Interaction (2.74)
Year Indicator in 2008 -2.23**
(-82.82)
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at
the 10(5) percent level. The selection model is equ. (40) in the text. The regressand is ￿rm￿ s export dummy. There
are 1,103,270 observations in the regressions. The interaction term for each year in the table means the product of
￿rm￿ s logarithm of tangible assets and the year indicator.
40Table 7: Alternative 2SLS Estimates, using Estimated Export Probability (2000-2008)
Regressand: Firm￿ s Revenue (1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest Payment 201.6** 206.6** 201.7** 260.6**
(12.23) (11.73) (31.49) (25.67)
Interest Payment￿Foreign Indicator 105.1** 101.9** 101.9** 79.99**
(2.23) (2.14) (9.84) (6.29)
Interest Payment￿Export Probability -103.2** -99.64** -99.64** -187.7**
(-2.62) (-2.35) (-5.79) (-7.97)
Interest Payment￿Export Probability -138.8 -139.1 -139.1** -88.56**
￿Foreign Indicator (-1.61) (-1.58) (-6.08) (-3.15)
Export Probability 11,798** -25,816** -25,816** -18,556
(4.00) (-6.77) (-13.69) (-1.18)
Export Probability￿Foreign Indicator 41,623** 45,986** 45,986** 38,631**
(3.14) (3.42) (10.89) (7.71)
Foreign Indicator -27,313** -28,837** -25,816** -25,212**
(-3.31) (-3.46) (-13.69) (-10.28)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM ￿2 statistic 311.3y 287.6y ￿ ￿
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 5.45 4.84
Industry-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes No
Year-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Indicator￿Ind. Fixed E⁄ects No No No Yes
Firm-Speci￿c Random E⁄ects No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,117,186 1,117,186 1,117,186 1,117,186
First-Stage Regressions
IV1: TFPOP
it .278** .275** .275** .139**
(3.54) (3.42) (25.83) (13.18)
[30.84] [27.11] ￿ ￿
IV2: TFPOP
it ￿Foreign Indicator .353** .358** .358** .357**
(2.76) (2.80) (32.85) (32.78)
[20.05] [22.62] ￿ ￿
IV3: TFPOP
it ￿Export Probability .237** .226* .226** .277**
(2.00) (1.93) (23.67) (29.12)
[39.17] [33.35] ￿ ￿
IV4: TFPOP
it ￿Foreign Indicator .750** .744** .744** .74**
￿Export Probability (3.73) (3.70) (67.72) (67.43)
[16.89] [24.26] ￿ ￿
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at the
10(5) percent level. Excluded F statistic in the ￿rst stage are reported in brackets. yindicates signi￿cance of p-value
at the 1 percent level. As introduced in the text, we use the predicted value in the Probit model to serve as the ￿rms￿
export probability.
In the ￿rst-stage regressions, IV1 reports the coe¢ cient of TFP (Olley-Pakes) level in the estimation using interest
payment as the regressand. Similarly, IV2 reports the coe¢ cient of the product between TFP level and foreign ￿rm
(FOR)￿ s dummy in the estimation using the product of interest payment and FOR as the regressand. IV3 reports
the coe¢ cient of the product between TFP level and export dummy in the estimation using the product of interest
payment and export dummy as the regressand. Finally, IV4 reports the coe¢ cient of the product among TFP level,
export dummy, foreign ￿rm￿ s dummy in the estimation using the product of interest payment, foreign dummy, and
export dummy as the regressand.
41Table 8: 2SLS Estimates (2000-2006) by Extent of Sea Shipments
Regressand: Firm￿ s Revenue Without Merge Merged with Trade Data (2000-2006)
Types of Shipments: All Firms All Firms >50% >95% >99%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interest Payment 199.3** 193.4** 191.2** 191.3** 191.1**
(41.84) (58.48) (66.92) (68.61) (69.84)
Interest Payment￿Foreign Indicator 2.94 20.06** 6.76 6.90 6.87
(.28) (2.46) (1.03) (1.08) (1.10)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator -51.30** -74.09** -77.46** -91.65** -94.79**
(-10.66) (-20.82) (-24.90) (-30.36) (-32.07)
Interest Payment￿Export Indicator 80.28** 36.51** 15.91** 22.78** 24.99**
￿Foreign Indicator (7.31) (4.30) (2.30) (3.39) (3.79)
Export Indicator -6,734** -8,583** -3,757** -1,376** -954.8
(13.95) (-7.71) (-6.06) (-2.14) (-1.41)
Export Indicator￿Foreign Indicator -2,182 5,938** 9,014** 6,120** 5,419**
(-1.34) (4.13) (6.83) (4.54) (3.88)
Foreign Indicator -7,177** -3,383** -7,013** -6,965** -6,940**
(-5.00) (-5.73) (-7.70) (-7.84) (-7.95)
Year-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Speci￿c Random E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 742,434 563,195 552,937 546,448 540,856
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at
the 10(5) percent level. In Column (2), we drop those exporting ￿rms which are not matched with trade data due to
lack of common identi￿ers in both ￿rm-level production data and trade data. Columns (3)-(5) reports the samples
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Average Industrial Interest Payment ($1,000)
Revenue & Interest Payment by 2-digit Industry (2000-2008)
Notes: The average industrial revenue and interest pament are calculated over years 2000-2008 by 2-digit level
Chinese manfuacturing sectors. Table 2 provides the detailed description for numbers of each sector.
Figure 1: Chinese Firm￿ s Revenue and Interest Payment by 2-digit Industry
43Appendix
A Solving the Bank￿ s Problem
A.1 The Loan Schedules
The constraints to the banks￿ s problem involve these control variables as well as their derivatives,
Md0
e (x) and M0
d(x). Incorporating constraints in the control variables and their derivatives is
relatively straighforward using the Euler-Lagrange equation of the calculus of variations (Chiang,











e. We de￿ne the Lagrangian function using the integrand of the bank￿ s objective





$ = (￿dId(x) ￿ i￿dMd (x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)(Md (x) ￿ Kd))f (x) (41)
+ ￿(x)
￿










￿eIe(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e)(Me (x) ￿ Ke) ￿ i￿dMd














We can simplify the bank￿ s problem for the exporting ￿rms by explicitly solving for the rela-
tionship between the loans Md
e (x) and Me
e (x); using the equality of marginal revenues in (10). As















￿eIe(x) + (1 ￿ ￿e)Ke ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e + i￿d)Md



































e] these conditions are:
f (x) + ￿0 (x) = 0; (43)






















d(x); and it follows that the second equation is
simpli￿ed as,









Using a similar simpli￿cation, for x 2 [x
ﬂ
e;1) we obtain the conditions:





















44We impose a tranversality condition on the bank￿ s problem such that ￿(1) = 0. Then





ﬂ e f (x)dx =
￿(x
ﬂ
e)￿(F (x) ￿ F (x
ﬂ
e)); where F (x) is the cumulative density function of f(x). Combined with the
transversality condition, it readily follows that ￿(x
ﬂ
e) = 1￿F (x
ﬂ
e) and consequently ￿(x) = 1￿F (x)




e) = 1 ￿ F (x
ﬂ
e) and the optimality condition for domestic ￿rms (43), we
















e=x, it follows that the solution for the credit constraints are as shown in
(18).
A.2 The Cuto⁄ Productivity Levels
Using the solutions for the domestic credit constraints ￿d together with the incentive-compatibility






















d) + [￿d + ￿(1 ￿ ￿d) ￿ 1](Md(x) ￿ Md(x
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d))=￿














e (x) ￿ i￿eMe
e (x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e)(Me (x) ￿ Ke)
￿
f (x)dx:


















The ￿rst term, the expected revenue, is given by the product of total variable cost, (Md(x)=￿ ￿ Cd),
the ratio of marginal revenue to marginal cost, ￿
￿￿1￿d. Since E (￿d(x;x)) is an increasing function








d)=￿ ￿ Cd) ￿ ￿dMd(x
ﬂ






















e)). By using (49)










e)=￿ ￿ Cd ￿ Ce) ￿ ￿eMe(x
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e, independently. Once the bank selects the the cuto⁄ productivities, it can then set the
associated interest payments for the cuto⁄ ￿rms according to (50) and (52). But from the latter
equation, the interest payments ￿eIe(x
ﬂ
e) will depend on the value of x
ﬂ
d, which appears on the right.
The ￿rst-order condition of (48) with respect to x
ﬂ
d is, taking into account that (52) includes
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d) ￿ i￿dMd (x
ﬂ
d) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)(Md (x
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d)=￿ ￿ Cd) ￿ (1 + i￿d)Md(x
ﬂ









The ￿rst-order condition with respect to x
ﬂ
d is then solved as,
Md(x
ﬂ













Cd = (￿ ￿ 1)Cd; (54)





Substituting this loan for the cuto⁄producer into (50), and we obtain the expected interest payment
for the cuto⁄ producer,
￿dId(x
ﬂ





￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)Kd: (55)





￿dId(x) = [￿d + ￿(1 ￿ ￿d) ￿ 1]
Md(x)
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The ￿rst-order condition with respect to x
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￿ ((1 ￿ ￿e)(Me (x
ﬂ
e) ￿ Ke) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)(Md (x
ﬂ
e) ￿ Kd))f (x
ﬂ
e) (57)
46Similar to the solution for x
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e)=￿ ￿ Cd ￿ Ce)f (x
ﬂ
e)


































































e)=￿ ￿ Cd ￿ Ce) due to (12). The right hand side of
















e) ￿ i￿dMd (x
ﬂ
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e)=￿ ￿ Cd ￿ Ce) ￿ (1 + i￿d)Md
e (x
ﬂ







































e)=￿ ￿ Cd ￿ Ce):









￿￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿e














(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + i￿￿e)Ce
















￿ (￿ ￿ 1)Ce
= ￿(￿ ￿ 1)Ce;
47where ￿ is de￿ned as in the text. We then have the loan for the cuto⁄ exporter as,
Me(x
ﬂ
e) = (￿(￿ ￿ 1) + 1)Ce + Cd:
Substituting the solution of the loan for the cuto⁄ exporter into (52), and with rather extensive
simpli￿cation, we can solve for the interest payment for the cuto⁄exporter as shown in (27). Notice
that the parameter ￿ is derived by
￿ = ￿eIe(x
ﬂ





























Cd ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e)Ke;
=




￿ (￿dCe ￿ ￿eCd) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿e)Ke;
where the ￿rst equality follows by substituting in the expected interest payment by the cuto⁄
exporter (52), the expected interest payment by domestic ￿rms (56) and the loan for the cuto⁄
exporter, and the second equality holds by substituting in ￿:
If the cash-￿ ow constraint is binding for the cuto⁄ exporter x
ﬂ
e but not the cuto⁄ domestic ￿rm
x
ﬂ
d in the above solution, then we substitute (55) into (52) and simplify to obtain,
￿eIe(x
ﬂ



































e)): Accordingly, the bank
can choose the minimum x
ﬂ
e at which the cash ￿ ow constraint of the exporter is satis￿ed, and then
set the interest payments as in (58) to ensure this equality of pro￿ts for the cuto⁄ exporter.
A.3 Monotonicity of Pro￿ts


































where the second line follows from the incentive-compatibility condition (6). Similarly, we can






￿ > 0: Substituting





￿d < 1 is needed to
ensure that dE (￿e(x;x))=dx > dE (￿d(x;x))=dx:
48